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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                          
 
 
Becker, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an underinsured motorist (UM) case governed by 
Pennsylvania law.  The appeal arises out of an action filed in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania by plaintiffs George and Evangelina Jumara seeking 
to appoint arbitrators and to compel arbitration by their own 
carrier, defendant State Farm Insurance Company.  Ultimately, it 
presents the question whether the Jumaras' (two) insurance 
contracts with State Farm, which incorporate the Pennsylvania 
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), contemplate arbitration-related 
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (PA) 
or in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, or in either court.  The district court denied the 
Jumaras' motion to compel arbitration (and thereby effectively 
dismissed the action), reasoning that the insurance contracts, in 
light of the Pennsylvania law that they incorporate, contained a 
forum selection clause that relegates the plaintiffs to suit in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.  We disagree, and 
will vacate the order denying plaintiff's motion.  
 Although the district court in effect disposed of the 
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (for improper venue), we conclude 
that, because venue was actually proper in the Eastern District 
  
of Pennsylvania, the case could not be dismissed pursuant to that 
provision.  The district court should instead have invoked 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a), which involves a multi-factor balancing test in 
which a contractual forum selection clause carries substantial 
although not dispositive weight.  However, because the other 
factors cannot even in combination overcome the forum selection 
clause, we will not remand the case, but rather will direct the 
district court to transfer the case to the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, a "court of 
record" in Luzerne County.1   
 
 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Plaintiffs are residents of Luzerne County.  While 
operating his motorcycle on May 22, 1992, George Jumara sustained 
serious injuries as a result of a collision with an automobile 
driven by Mary Reynolds.  Jumara underwent emergency surgery for 
numerous lacerations and fractures.  On June 9, 1992, the Jumaras 
filed a tort action against Reynolds, which they eventually 
settled on October 20, 1994 for the limits of Reynolds' 
automobile liability insurance policy, with the permission of 
                     
1
.  Prior to argument, we requested supplementary briefs on the 
question of whether this case was justiciable, i.e., whether 
there was a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III 
of the Constitution, and whether the dispute was ripe for 
decision.  This question arose because the Jumaras sought to 
compel the appointment of an arbitrator before the amounts of the 
underlying claims for underinsured motorists benefits were 
determined.  (The Jumaras had not yet settled their claim against 
Reynolds when they filed this action.)  After argument, any such 
question was resolved by the Jumaras' settlement with Reynolds 
for the limits of her liability policy. 
  
State Farm.  At the time of the accident, the Jumaras' two cars 
were covered by automobile insurance policies issued by State 
Farm.  Each policy included underinsured motorist coverage of 
$100,000/$300,000, and each provided for arbitration in the event 
of disputes.  Reynolds was covered by a $100,000 liability 
policy. 
 On January 21, 1994, the Jumaras claimed underinsured 
motorist benefits in the amount of $200,000 under their policies 
by filing a complaint in the district court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (¶ 9 of Petition).  The complaint 
designated Steven C. Forman as the Jumaras' arbitrator, and 
sought the appointment of neutral and defense arbitrators and an 
order compelling underinsured motorist arbitration.2  The Jumaras 
served this complaint on State Farm on February 8, 1994.   
 In response, State Farm designated Joseph Van Jura as 
its arbitrator, but, based on the arbitration provisions 
contained in the insurance contracts, challenged venue in the 
Eastern District. On April 4, 1994, the district court held that 
proper venue lay with the Court of Common Pleas in Luzerne County 
and therefore denied the Jumaras' motion.  The Jumaras have 
appealed.  As of the time of oral argument before us, the two 
parties' arbitrators had been unable to agree on a neutral third 
arbitrator.   
                     
2
.  The dissent inadvertently represents that the Jumaras sought 
only the appointment of arbitrators in their petition. 
  
 By directing the Jumaras to the Pennsylvania state 
court, the district court's order in effect terminated the 
federal litigation of the Jumaras underinsured motorist claim.  
The order denying the Jumaras' motion was premised on the 
district court's view that Pennsylvania insurance law limited the 
Jumaras to proceeding in the Courts of Common Pleas.  The court 
suggested no circumstances under which it would reconsider 
granting the Jumaras' motion, and hence the district court's 
order is final and appealable.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1994). 
 II.  SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
 Jurisdiction in the district court was premised upon 
diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1994).  The Jumaras 
are citizens of Pennsylvania, and State Farm is a citizen of 
Illinois, which is the state of its incorporation and the 
location of its principal place of business.  Thus the Jumaras 
established the complete diversity required by § 1332(a). 
 The diversity statute further requires, of course, that 
the amount in controversy be in excess of $50,000.  28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1332(a) (1994).  While the Jumaras allege that State Farm is 
obligated to pay compensation in excess of that amount (up to 
$200,000 or the sum of the underinsured motorist benefits of each 
of the Jumara's policies), they did not demand any money damages 
in the district court; rather they sought only arbitration.  
Because of the nature of the policy, the amount of the Jumaras' 
claim against State Farm depends on the insurance shortfall left 
by Reynolds' policy, itself a function of the extent of both Mr. 
Jumara's injuries and the recovery available under Reynolds' 
  
policy.  Because the Jumaras did not allege the amount of the 
insurance shortfall, the question arises as to whether the 
Jumaras have satisfied the diversity statute's amount in 
controversy requirement.  Indeed, State Farm argued in the 
district court that the lack of amount in controversy deprived 
that court of subject matter jurisdiction, an argument rejected 
by the court.  
 The question, however, is far from novel.  We faced a 
similar situation in Manze v. State Farm Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 1062, 
1068 (3d Cir. 1987).  In Manze, the plaintiff sought to compel 
arbitration with her insurance company and appointment of a 
neutral arbitrator, and the carrier removed the action to federal 
court.  Although the demand made by the insured on her insurer 
exceeded the jurisdictional minimum, and the policy provided 
coverage in excess of the minimum, the plaintiff objected to 
diversity jurisdiction, contending that the amount in controversy 
requirement was unmet because she had asked the state court only 
to compel arbitration, not to award the amount she demanded.   
 We rejected her argument, holding that the requirement 
was satisfied despite the fact that the action did not itself 
seek monetary relief, id. at 1068.  We expressly followed 
Davenport v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 
1957), which denied a motion to remand to state court a (removed) 
action to compel arbitration according to the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement, quoting Davenport's discussion 
of the amount in controversy requirement: 
  
 In considering the jurisdictional amount 
requirement the court should look through to 
the possible award resulting from the desired 
arbitration, since the petition to compel 
arbitration is only the initial step in a 
litigation which seeks as its goal a judgment 
affirming the award. 
Manze, 817 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Davenport, 241 F.2d at 514).  
Thus the amount in controversy in a petition to compel 
arbitration or appoint an arbitrator is determined by the 
underlying cause of action that would be arbitrated. 
 This is in accord with general precedent concerning the 
amount in controversy requirement.  The allegations on the face 
of the complaint control the amount in controversy unless it 
appears "`to a legal certainty the claim is really for less than 
the jurisdictional amount . . . .'"  Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353, 81 S. Ct. 1570, 1573 (1961) (quoting St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 
S. Ct. 586, 590 (1938)).  Indeterminacy of the amount to be 
recovered is therefore not sufficient to defeat diversity 
jurisdiction, and so it is immaterial that the Jumaras might 
eventually recover less than $50,000 from State Farm.  Given that 
the Jumaras allege quite serious injuries and an entitlement to 
as much as $200,000 in underinsured motorist benefits, we cannot 
say with legal certainty that the Jumaras will recover less than 
$50,000.  Thus, the amount in controversy requirement is 
satisfied, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.  
We therefore turn to the merits of this appeal. 
 
  
 III.  VENUE 
 As we have explained, the district court dismissed the 
Jumaras' complaint by denying their motion to appoint arbitrators 
and to compel arbitration on the grounds of faulty venue.3   We 
conclude that the district court should instead have considered 
whether to transfer the case to the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  We further conclude 
that the court should have ordered the transfer to the Middle 
District. 
A. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE ACTED PURSUANT TO 
 28 U.S.C. § 1404 OR 28 U.S.C. § 1406?   
 The salient factor here is the presence of the forum 
selection clause.  In federal court, the effect to be given a 
contractual forum selection clause in diversity cases is 
determined by federal not state law.  Because "[q]uestions of 
venue and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are 
essentially procedural, rather than substantive, in nature," 
Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1991), federal law 
                     
3
.  The dissent argues that neither the parties nor the court 
ever invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (the general venue provision), 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) or § 1406 in terms.  However, the district 
courts' order denying all of the relief sought in the action -- 
effectively dismissing the Jumara's suit -- relied on the premise 
that this action could only be brought in a court of Luzerne 
County.  Thus, notwithstanding its failure to frame its order in 
venue terms or to cite the relevant venue statutes, the district 
court effectively dismissed the case for faulty venue, an action 
addressed by § 1406.  We hold, however, that the court's initial 
premise, that venue was actually improper in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, was erroneous, and that, if the district court 
thought the action should instead proceed in the Middle District, 
it would have to consider transferring the case pursuant to § 
1404. 
  
applies in diversity cases irrespective of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).   
 In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 
22, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988), the Supreme Court held that federal 
law governed the district court's decision whether to grant a 
motion to transfer a diversity case to the venue provided in the 
contractual forum selection clause.  The Court noted that venue 
was proper in the district court under federal law (ignoring the 
forum selection clause).  Id. at 28 n.8, 108 S. Ct. at 2243 n.8.  
The majority rejected the dissent's contention that the effect -- 
if any -- of a forum selection clause should be a matter purely 
of contractual interpretation governed by state law.  Instead, 
the Court required the district court to apply a case-specific 
balancing pursuant to the standards laid out in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) to determine whether to give the clause effect by 
transferring the case to another district court embracing the 
contractually specified forum.    
 In federal court, venue questions are governed either 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.  Section 1404(a) 
provides for the transfer of a case where both the original and 
the requested venue are proper.  Section 1406, on the other hand, 
applies where the original venue is improper and provides for 
either transfer or dismissal of the case.  Thus, while either 
statute could theoretically provide a basis for the transfer of a 
case, only § 1406 can support a dismissal.  Because the district 
court's order effectively terminated the litigation in federal 
  
court and did not attempt to effect a transfer of the case, we 
will construe the order as a dismissal pursuant to § 1406.   
 This determination of whether § 1404(a) or § 1406 
applies affects our standard of review.  If we determine that the 
court correctly applied §1406, i.e., if the action could not be 
maintained in the Eastern District, our threshold review is 
limited to determining whether the court considered the 
possibility of transferring the case, and if it did, whether it 
properly exercised its discretion in ordering a dismissal instead 
of a transfer.  See 1A PT.2 JAMES W. MOORE & BRETT A. RINGLE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶0.347, at 4446 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter MOORE'S].  If 
the court did consider transferring the case, then our review of 
the exercise of discretion would be deferential.  In contrast, if 
we decide that the district court failed to consider the transfer 
and applied § 1406 instead of § 1404(a), the order dismissing the 
case would reflect an error of law, subject to plenary review.  
Cf. Kean v. Stone, 966 F.2d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
the question whether a district court applied the correct legal 
standard in deciding a fee award should receive plenary review 
notwithstanding the fact that fee awards are ordinarily reviewed 
only for an abuse of discretion).   
 In order to decide which statute should have governed 
the district court's transfer order in this case, therefore, we 
must first decide whether venue was proper in either or both the 
Middle District or the Eastern District.   
 The federal venue statute provides: 
  
  (a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded 
only on diversity of citizenship may, except as 
otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a 
judicial district where any defendant resides, if all 
defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial 
district in which a substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of property that is the subject of the 
action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which 
the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at 
the time the action is commenced, if there is no 
district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 
 
 * * * 
 
  (c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a 
defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to 
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject 
to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 
commenced.  In a State which has more than one judicial 
district and in which a defendant that is a corporation 
is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an 
action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed 
to reside in any district in that State within which 
its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to 
personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate 
State, and, if there is no such district, the 
corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district 
within which it has the most significant contacts. 
28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
 Clearly, venue would be proper in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania where the plaintiff resides, the defendant 
transacts business, the contract was signed, and events 
triggering the dispute occurred.  Venue is also proper, however, 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the defendant 
transacts business and is therefore subject to personal 
jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (venue proper in judicial 
district in which corporation is doing business); see also 
Stewart Organization, Inc., 487 U.S. at 29 n.8, 108 S.Ct. at 2243 
  
n.8 ("The parties do not dispute that the District Court properly 
denied the motion to  dismiss the case for improper venue under 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) because respondent apparently does business 
[there].")  Since venue is proper in the Eastern District where 
the action commenced, the district court's effective dismissal of 
the action constituted an error of law.  The District Court 
should instead have applied the appropriate balancing test under 
28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to determine whether the case should proceed 
in the Eastern District or be transferred to the Middle 
District.4   
 
B.  APPLICATION OF SECTION 1404(a) 
 Section 1404(a) provides:  "For the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district 
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought."  The burden of 
establishing the need for transfer still rests with the movant, 
1A PT.2 MOORE'S ¶ 0.345[5]; Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 
22 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910, 91 S. Ct. 871 
(1971).  And, "in ruling on defendants' motion the plaintiff's 
choice of venue should not be lightly disturbed."  1A PT.2 MOORE'S 
¶ 0.345[5] at 4360; 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
                     
4
.  The dissent argues that, in holding that the district court 
should have considered transfer under § 1404(a), we "evolve 
analyses and theories that neither the district court nor counsel 
considered . . . ."  We disagree.  In holding that the action 
could only proceed in a court of Luzerne County, an argument 
raised by State Farm, the district court clearly did consider the 
sort of venue analysis upon which we base our holding. 
  
PROCEDURE:  JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3848, at 385 (2d ed. 1986) 
[hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL.]; Schexnider v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 
817 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987); Miracle Stretch Underwear Corp. v. 
Alba Hosiery Mills, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del. 1955).   
 In ruling on § 1404(a) motions, courts have not limited 
their consideration to the three enumerated factors in §1404(a) 
(convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, or interests 
of justice), and, indeed, commentators have called on the courts 
to "consider all relevant factors to determine whether on balance 
the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interests 
of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum."  
15 WRIGHT ET AL. § 3847.  While there is no definitive formula or 
list of the factors to consider, see 1A PT.2 MOORE'S ¶ 0.345[5], 
at 4363, courts have considered many variants of the private and 
public interests protected by the language of § 1404(a).  
 The private interests have included:  plaintiff's forum 
preference as manifested in the original choice, 1A PT.2 MOORE'S 
¶ 0.345[5], at 4363; the defendant's preference, 15 WRIGHT ET AL. § 
3848, at 385; whether the claim arose elsewhere, 15 WRIGHT ET AL. § 
3848; the convenience of the parties as indicated by their 
relative physical and financial condition, id. § 3849, at 408; 
the convenience of the witnesses -- but only to the extent that 
the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the 
fora, id. § 3851, at 420-22; and the location of books and 
records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not 
be produced in the alternative forum), id. § 3853. 
  
 The public interests have included:  the enforceability 
of the judgment, 1A PT.2 MOORE'S ¶ 0.345[5], at 4367; practical 
considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or 
inexpensive, id.; the relative administrative difficulty in the 
two fora resulting from court congestion, id., at 4373; 15 WRIGHT 
ET AL. § 3854; the local interest in deciding local controversies 
at home, 1A PT.2 MOORE'S ¶ 0.345[5] at 4374; the public policies 
of the fora, see 15 WRIGHT ET AL. § 3854; and the familiarity of the 
trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases. 15 
WRIGHT ET AL. § 3854. 
 Within this framework, a forum selection clause is 
treated as a manifestation of the parties' preferences as to a 
convenient forum.  Hence, within the framework of § 1404, 
Congress "encompasse[d]  consideration of the parties' private 
expression of their venue preferences."  Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-
30, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.  Although the parties' agreement as to 
the most proper forum should not receive dispositive weight, id. 
at 31, 108 S.Ct. at 2245; Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, 
Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988), it is entitled to 
substantial consideration.  See Weiss v. Columbia Pictures 
Television, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(quoting Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S. Ct. at 2243).  Thus, 
while courts normally defer to a plaintiff's choice of forum, 
such deference is inappropriate where the plaintiff has already 
freely contractually chosen an appropriate venue.  See In re 
Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (remand of 
Stewart); Weiss, 801 F. Supp. at 1278.  Where the forum selection 
  
clause is valid, which requires that there have been no "fraud, 
influence, or overweening bargaining power," see The Bremen v. 
Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1914-15 
(1972), the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating why they 
should not be bound by their contractual choice of forum. 
 Such an extensive enumeration of factors to be balanced 
makes "a written opinion setting forth the reasons for transfer 
. . . highly desirable, [although] not essential if the record 
shows that the proper factors were considered." 1A PT.2 MOORE'S, ¶ 
0.345[5], at 4381; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Weigel, 426 F.2d 
1356 (9th Cir 1970).  In light of this principle, the district 
court's rather opaque order is problematic.  Even had the court 
believed that it was applying § 1404(a), there is no indication 
that it properly considered these factors, and the written order 
denying the motion to appoint the arbitrators does not satisfy 
the mandate that the proper factors be considered.  Ordinarily, 
we would remand for further consideration; here, however, the 
factors unequivocally support a transfer to the venue specified 
in the contractual forum selection clause, so that a remand is 
unnecessary.   
 We note in this regard that some courts have refused to 
apply this multi-factored balancing test where the transfer 
requested involves a forum which is a relatively short distance 
from the original forum.  Instead, such courts have simply 
refused to consider transfer, arguing that the statute was not 
intended for these types of transfers, and some commentators have 
agreed.  See 15 WRIGHT ET AL. § 3854, at 470 (citing cases).    
  
 But refusing to entertain the transfer would leave this 
case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, an odd result given 
the location of the parties, the situs of the original contract, 
and the ultimate location of the arbitration proceedings 
themselves pursuant to the contractual forum selection clause, as 
we explain in the balance of this opinion.  Although we recognize 
the validity of these other courts' concerns, we believe the 
factors weigh so heavily in favor of transferring this action to 
the Middle District that we will apply § 1404(a) notwithstanding 
the proximity of the alternative fora. 
  
 C.  THE CONTRACTUAL VENUE PROVISIONS 
 In concluding that this action to compel arbitration 
could only be brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne 
County, the district court relied on its interpretation of the 
insurance contract.  As we have explained, however, the decision 
whether venue was appropriate in the original forum or whether 
the action should be transferred involves a multi-factored test 
incorporating the forum selection clause as one facet of the 
convenience-of-the-parties consideration.  Hence, while the 
district court should have interpreted and considered the 
contractual choice of forum, it erred to the extent that it 
accorded the clause dispositive effect.   
 Beyond relegating the forum selection clause to being a 
non-dispositive factor, albeit one entitled to "substantial 
consideration," we also review the district court's construction 
of the provision.  A district court's construction of a contract 
  
is subject to plenary review, as it concerns the legal effect of 
an agreement and is therefore a question of law.  Vanguard 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 900 
F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 1990).  We conclude that, although the 
parties did contemplate that this action transpire within Luzerne 
County, they did not limit the fora to the state courts but 
rather intended to permit the action in any court, including the 
federal court, of the county. 
 The insurance contracts between the Jumaras and State 
Farm provide that the matters of whether the Jumaras are entitled 
to collect damages from the owner of an underinsured motor 
vehicle and if so, in what amount, are questions to be decided by 
agreement of the parties.  The contracts further provide: 
 If there is no agreement, these questions 
shall be decided by arbitration at the 
request of the insured or us.  The 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act, as 
amended from time to time, shall apply. 
 
 Each party shall select a competent and 
impartial arbitrator.  These two shall select 
a third one.  If unable to agree on a third 
one within 30 days either party may request a 
judge of a court of record in the county in 
which the arbitration is pending to select a 
third one.  The written decision of any two 
arbitrators shall be binding on each party. 
 
* * * 
 
 The arbitration shall take place in the 
county in which the insured resides unless 
the parties agree to another place.  State 
court rules governing procedure and admission 
of evidence shall be used. 
App. at 144a. 
  
 Plaintiffs correctly note that the requirement that 
arbitration occur in the county of their residence controls only 
the location of the arbitration proceeding.  By its terms, this 
provision says nothing about where a petition to appoint 
arbitrators or to compel arbitration may be brought.  Accord 
Shapiro v. Keystone Ins. Co., 558 A.2d 891, 894 (Pa. Super. 
1989).  But this conclusion does not end our inquiry.5 
 By its terms, the agreement directs that where, as 
here, the two parties' arbitrators are unable to agree on a 
neutral third arbitrator, "either party may request a judge of a 
court of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending 
to select a third one."  Although the district court concluded 
that this could only occur in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Luzerne County, we hold that the phrase "a court of record in the 
county" includes the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, the federal judicial district that 
encompasses Luzerne County.  Our construction follows from the 
fact that the federal courts are "courts" within the meaning of 
the Pennsylvania UAA, which is incorporated in the insurance 
contracts.  As we noted in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gammon, 838 F.2d 
73 (3d Cir. 1988), the UAA was amended to change the definition 
of "courts" from merely "the common pleas courts of the county 
                     
5
.  Although neither party was able at oral argument to explain 
how arbitration could actually be "pending" when arbitrators have 
not been selected, we agree with the parties that the only 
sensible construction of the contract language ("the county in 
which the arbitration is pending") is to refer to the county 
where the arbitration proceeding will be pending or held, i.e., 
Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. 
  
having jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter" to "any 
court of competent jurisdiction of [the] Commonwealth."  Id. at 
76-77 (quoting former § 178 of the Pa. UAA and 42 PA. CON. STAT. 
ANN. § 7318 (1952)).  This venue provision thus permits 
applications for appointment of arbitrators to be made to the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 This conclusion does not by itself determine whether, 
pursuant to this contractual provision, venue might not be proper 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for the quoted provision 
is permissive ("either party may request"), see supra at 17, and 
thus leaves unresolved the question of the parties' intent, i.e., 
whether they intended to make an exclusive choice of courts of 
Luzerne County as the only fora for these actions.  It is 
nevertheless unnecessary to remand this case to the district 
court for the purpose of determining the parties' intent with 
respect to the forum selection provision, inasmuch as other 
provisions of the contract resolve any ambiguity.   
 The insurance contracts specifically direct that "the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act . . . shall apply."  Section 
7304 of the UAA provides that "[o]n application to a court to 
compel arbitration . . ., the court shall order the parties to 
proceed with arbitration."  42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7304 (1982).  
We believe that section § 7319, which governs venue 
considerations, is dispositive.  It commands that ("[e]xcept 
where otherwise prescribed by general rules"), 
  
 [a]n initial application to a court under 
this subchapter shall be made to the court of 
the county in which the agreement prescribes 
that the arbitration hearing shall be held 
or, if the hearing has been held, in the 
county in which the hearing was held. 
42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7319(1) (1982) (emphasis added). 
 Thus, by incorporating the UAA, the insurance contracts 
between the Jumaras and State Farm dictate that actions to compel 
arbitration be made to "a court of record" of Luzerne County, see 
supra at 17.  As we explained above, this includes the 
appropriate United States District Court.  While it thus includes 
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which 
embraces Luzerne County, it does not include the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District, which is not a court "of 
[Luzerne] county."  The district court was therefore correct in 
concluding that, by their express terms, the insurance contracts 
under which the Jumaras were proceeding did not contemplate venue 
in the Eastern District. 
 D.  OTHER § 1404 CONSIDERATIONS  
 As we have already explained, courts balancing the 
convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and 
the interests of justice should place considerable weight on the 
parties' original choice of forum, as expressed in a contractual 
forum selection clause.  The insurance contract at issue here 
contained a forum selection clause in effect specifying the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania as the site for any arbitration 
under the contract.  There is no claim of unequal bargaining that 
might invalidate the clause.  The plaintiffs in this case clearly 
  
cannot make the showing of convenience necessary to overcome the 
presumption established by the forum selection clause, and 
neither the witness convenience nor the interest-of-justice 
factors counsel in favor of maintaining the action in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Indeed, some of these other 
considerations actually militate in favor of the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania.  
 Everything related to this action occurred in Luzerne 
county, which lies in the Middle District:  plaintiff resides 
there, the contract was signed there, the underlying accident 
occurred there, and the requested arbitration will eventually 
occur there.  Unlike Red Bull Associates, 862 F.2d at 963, where 
the federal forum had a strong policy interest in enforcing the 
civil rights laws thus justifying setting aside a forum selection 
clause, the Eastern District has no corresponding public policy 
interest in appointing the arbitrator in this case.  Given the 
close proximity of the two fora, the § 1404(a) factors other than 
the forum selection clause factors -- the relative physical and 
financial condition of the parties, the location of the 
witnesses, the situs of the documentary evidence, and the 
relative expense or expeditiousness of the trial -- do not render 
one forum significantly more convenient than the other, and they 
certainly do not support overriding the parties' original venue 
preference as expressed in the forum selection clause.6  
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.  The financial condition of the Jumaras might make the Middle 
District more convenient to them, but since their present counsel 
is from Philadelphia that consideration would appear muted. 
  
 The fact that the two fora are adjacent districts of 
the same state also obscures the interest-of-justice analysis, 
which gives little reason to override the forum selection clause.  
None of the following factors exist:  (1) a likelihood of an 
enforcement problem; (2) a distinct public interest in resolving 
the claims in a Luzerne County court as opposed to in 
Philadelphia; (3) a different policy preference in the two 
locales; (4) a disparity in the qualifications of the federal 
judges sitting in the two districts to pass on the same 
Pennsylvania law; or (5) an appreciable difference in docket 
congestion between the two districts.  After reviewing the 
various facets of the convenience of the parties and witnesses as 
well as the interests of justice, we do not believe that these 
factors, most of which cannot distinguish the fora on convenience 
grounds, could overcome the "substantial consideration" due the 
forum selection clause. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court explained in Stewart that section 
1404(a) was intended to vest district courts with broad 
discretion to determine, on an individualized, case-by-case 
basis, whether convenience and fairness considerations weigh in 
favor of transfer.  Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31, 108 S. Ct. at 
2244.  Because it appears that the district court erroneously 
believed that this action could only be brought in state court, 
it did not construe State Farm's objection to the appointment as 
a § 1404(a) motion.  As a result, the court did not make the 
determinations required by that provision.  However, because the 
  
balance in this case so clearly mandates a transfer to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, a remand to the district court for the 
§ 1404 balancing is unnecessary.  We will therefore vacate the 
district court's order denying the motion to appoint arbitrators 
and compel arbitration, and direct the district court to order 
the transfer. 
  
 ______________________ 
 
George Jumara; et al. v. State Farm Insurance Company,  
No. 94-1447 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 After the Jumaras filed their petition and their motion 
to appoint arbitrators, State Farm filed its answer in 
opposition.  The panel majority has now concluded that the 
district court erred by failing to transfer the Jumaras' 
proceeding to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  It does so by 
using some judicial alchemy to transform State Farm's answer to 
the Jumaras' motion to appoint arbitrators into a motion to 
transfer venue under the federal venue statutes, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1391, 1404 and 1406. 
 It so holds even while it agrees that the district 
court judge was eminently correct when he denied the Jumaras' 
petition to appoint arbitrators.  Despite this admission, the 
majority directs that the district court's order denying 
appointment of arbitrators must be vacated.  It also requires 
that the district court transfer the Jumaras' petition to the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania -- a transfer sought by neither 
of the parties and certainly not desired by the Jumaras. 
 Because I believe that we should not vacate a district 
court's order when the substantive order that it entered was 
unquestionably correct in light of the issues raised by the 
parties, and because no party in this case ever sought a 
§ 1404(a) transfer of venue, either on appeal before us, or even 
  
more importantly, before the district court, I am compelled to 
dissent.7 
 
 I. 
 It should be remembered that the Jumaras' counsel only 
petitioned the district court for the appointment of arbitrators 
and to compel arbitration.  He did so by invoking those portions 
of the Jumaras' insurance contract and the sections of the 
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act referred to by the majority.  
                     
7
.   A question arose early on in this case whether the 
district court was ever presented with a justiciable case or 
controversy within the meaning of Article III.  Under the 
ripeness doctrine, federal courts "will not decide a case where 
the claim involves contingent future events that may not occur as 
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."  Thomas v. Union 
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985). 
 The Jumaras seek ultimately to recover underinsurance 
benefits from State Farm.  By definition, and by the terms of the 
insurance contract between the parties, underinsurance coverage 
becomes available only after (1) it is determined that the 
individual responsible for the harm complained of is liable and 
unable to fully compensate the insured, or (2) the limits of the 
tortfeasor's coverage has been offered. 
 Unless and until these conditions have been satisfied, 
any judicial pronouncement on the matter is necessarily 
speculative and vain.  If for instance it is later found that the 
alleged tortfeasor's liability is within the limits of her own 
liability coverage (or indeed that she is not liable at all), 
then the exertions of counsel and arbitrators, with their 
associated costs to the parties, as well as the efforts of the 
courts, will have been for nought. 
 We have been informed by counsel for the Jumaras that 
on October 20, 1994, the Jumaras' action against Reynolds, the 
alleged tortfeasor, was settled for the limits of Reynolds' 
vehicle policy and that State Farm had waived its subrogation 
rights.  This, of course, triggered the Jumaras' rights under the 
provisions of the Jumaras' own policy. 
  
It was this motion that the district court denied, and properly 
so, on the basis of the factual and legal contentions before it. 
 There can be no question that the majority is correct 
in pointing out that under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the district 
court when faced with a motion challenging venue, is limited to 
either retaining jurisdiction over the proceeding, or 
transferring jurisdiction to the district where it should have 
been brought.  In this case, the most appropriate venue lay in 
any court of competent jurisdiction of Luzerne County, which 
would include the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gammon, 838 
F.2d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that district courts are 
included within the meaning of "any court of competent 
jurisdiction of [the] Commonwealth"). 
 I have no problem with the majority's analysis of 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406.  Nor do I have a problem with the 
majority's ultimate determination that the factors relevant to 
retaining jurisdiction under § 1404(a) or transferring a 
proceeding to another locality under § 1404(a) favor giving 
predominant weight to the forum selection clause in the parties' 
contract.  Thus, I do not dispute the majority's view that the 
Middle District was one venue open to the parties, as was the 
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.     
 Nor do I quarrel with the majority's analysis of the 
federal venue provisions.  In this case, of course, the forum 
  
selection clause unquestionably required any application for 
arbitrators to be made in Luzerne County and not in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  The majority so holds, and if it were 
not for the fact that §§ 1404 and 1406 were never raised nor 
presented as an issue in the Jumaras' proceedings, I would have 
joined the majority opinion.  However, at no time, and in no 
court, did either the Jumaras or State Farm seek a venue change 
under § 1404(a) or even mention § 1404(a) in their respective 
arguments or briefs. 
 I emphasize first and foremost that neither party -- 
neither the Jumaras nor State Farm -- ever invoked, referred to, 
cited or argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (venue generally), or 
§ 1404 (change of venue), or § 1406 (cure or waiver of defects 
[in venue]) should be considered by any court.8  The motion made 
by the Jumaras was purely and simply a substantive motion to 
"Appoint Neutral and Defense Arbitrators and to Compel 
Underinsured Motorist Arbitration."   It was that motion, and 
                     
8
.  I note that venue is a privilege provided to the defendant, 
that this privilege may be waived, and that it is waived if it is 
not expressly asserted.  See generally, A. WRIGHT ET AL. FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3829, 
AT 309 - 318 (2D ED. 1986).  Moreover, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) 
requires that a defense of improper venue be raised in the 
responsive pleadings or by motion, or it will be deemed waived. 
 In light of the record before us, which is totally 
devoid of any mention of § 1406, § 1404, or § 1391 (the general 
federal venue statute) in any pleading or motion, it is 
surprising to me that the majority has ignored all waiver 
jurisprudence and has gratuitously embarked on a venue analysis 
which the parties and the district court have evidently abjured. 
  
only that motion, that the district court considered and denied.  
It did so properly and correctly, and the majority of the court 
does not argue otherwise.   
 The record does not reveal that either party ever 
raised the issue of § 1404 venue before the district court.  At 
no time did the district court ever advert to the subject of 
§ 1404 venue.  The district court's opinion makes no reference to 
§ 1404 venue.  The briefs before us did not raise any issue of 
§ 1404 venue.  The argument before us never touched on any of the 
federal venue statutes.  Indeed, the first time that § 1404 or 
§ 1406 surfaced was when the majority, relying upon those 
statutes, took the occasion to vacate the district court's order 
and to direct the district court to order a transfer of the 
Jumaras' proceedings to the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to § 1404(a).   
 Had the issue of venue under § 1404(a) been raised, I 
could not fault the majority for holding that § 1404 required a 
transfer.  However, where the issue of § 1404(a) venue was never 
raised and where the district court judge was presented only with 
the substantive issue of appointing an arbitrator, I cannot find 
fault, and I suggest the majority should not find fault, with the 
district judge's disposition of the matter.  In my opinion, 
counsel have an obligation to specifically inform the judge 
exactly what it is that they desire and they must then support 
that request for relief with appropriate authority.  Here, the 
  
district court was asked only to appoint arbitrators. It was 
never asked to consider a venue change under § 1404 or § 1406, 
and indeed, despite the majority's claim that the district court 
considered venue, it did not consider or analyze the federal 
venue provisions.  It was the issue of appointing arbitrators, 
and that issue only, that the district court decided. 
 It is true that the district court in its footnote to 
its order referred to Luzerne County as the proper place to seek 
relief.  But, the district court did not order transfer to 
Luzerne County because it was obviously never asked to do so.  
The Jumaras never asked for a transfer of venue.  Quite to the 
contrary, the Jumaras' counsel has persistently argued that the 
Jumaras do not desire venue in Luzerne County.  Why not?  Because 
arbitrators selected from Luzerne County might not be as liberal 
with an insurance company's dollars as the arbitrators appointed 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.   
 For this reason, as candidly expressed by counsel, 
application was made by the Jumaras to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  We were informed 
that an arbitrator appointed from within the geographical scope 
of the Eastern District was likely to award a higher amount of 
damages than an arbitrator appointed from Luzerne County.9 
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.  At oral argument counsel for the Jumaras explained the rather 
parochial practice of Philadelphia arbitrators in underinsurance 
cases.  They apparently determine what a case is "worth" and then 
make an underinsurance award of the amount by which the 
claimant's "damages" exceed the policy limits of the putative 
tortfeasor's insurance.  They do so seemingly in disregard of the 
  
  The record just does not reveal that State Farm asked 
the district court to exercise its § 1404(a) discretion to 
transfer the matter to Luzerne County.  State Farm took the 
position that the Jumaras' petition should be denied outright -- 
as it was.  How then can we direct the district court to order a 
transfer in conformity with relief that it was never asked to 
grant and which neither of the parties sought? 
 One would think that we would affirm a district court's 
order where the district court did not err in its substantive 
disposition and where the district court was asked to do nothing 
more than to decide the motion brought before it by the 
plaintiff.10  Here, the Jumaras sought the appointment of 
(..continued) 
contractual conditions precedent referred to in note 1, supra.  
Counsel also represented that it is the practice of Scranton 
arbitrators, as contrasted with arbitrators appointed in the 
Eastern District, to refrain from making an award until the 
underlying claim has been resolved.  
 Together with both counsel, I share an inability to 
explain how an arbitral award of underinsurance coverage may 
properly be made prior to determining the extent (or even the 
existence) of the alleged tortfeasor's liability.  
10
.  It is obvious to me, if not to the majority, that the 
district court contemplated that the Jumaras would bring a new 
action in Luzerne County after they were denied the appointment 
of arbitrators in the Eastern District.  The majority states 
that, to implement this, "...it [the district court] would have 
to consider transferring the case pursuant to § 1404."  Maj. Op. 
p. 8, n. 3.  The difficulty with the district court considering 
such a transfer was that neither the district court nor the 
parties ever considered § 1404.  The district court considered 
such a transfer, if at all, only under the Commonwealth's 
statutes, which could not in any event have been employed in a 
federal court's venue analysis, as the majority makes clear in 
its analysis of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 
U.S. 22 (1988). 
  
arbitrators.  The district court properly denied that motion.  
The district court was never asked about, or even became 
acquainted with, the venue considerations that the majority has 
today, by hindsight, now developed and analyzed.  However, the 
majority, without discussing the sua sponte responsibilities of a 
district court to supply that which counsel has not supplied, 
asked for, or even referred to, nevertheless has now vacated the 
district court's order and has directed it to transfer the 
proceeding to Luzerne County.   
 I cannot condone reversing a district court judge when 
he has done no more than rule correctly on the issue as 
formulated by the parties.  I do not think that an appellate 
court can or should convene months later and evolve analyses and 
theories that neither the district court nor counsel ever 
considered and then, for the first time, impose them upon the 
district court.   
 The majority in its footnotes 3 and 4 seeks to excuse 
its gratuitous discussion of federal venue under §§ 1404 and 1406 
by noting that the district court in the footnote to its April 4, 
1994 order, states that the Jumaras' proceeding should be 
conducted in Luzerne County.  There is no question but that the 
district court was aware of a venue defect.  But there is also no 
question that the venue issue, if addressed at all by the 
parties, was addressed under the terms of the State Farm contract 
and the Pennsylvania venue statutes, and not under the federal 
  
venue statutes.  Thus, the majority is plainly disingenuous when 
it states, at page 12, footnote 4, that "...the district court 
clearly did consider the sort of venue analysis upon which we 
base our holding."  The district court at no time considered a 
venue analysis which drew on the federal venue statutes, §§ 1404, 
1406 and 1391, the very statutes on which the majority bases its 
holding. 
 
 II. 
 Our decision in this case was crystal clear.  We should 
have affirmed the very correct decision made by the district 
court judge.  We did not.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
